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CASENOTE

United States v. Patane: The Supreme
Court's Continued Assault on Miranda

I.

INTRODUCTION

Patane,1

the United States Supreme Court ruled
In United States v.
on the issue of whether a police officer's failure to give a suspect the
complete Miranda warnings required the court to suppress a gun found
as a result of the suspect's voluntary statements. 2 In a 5-4 decision, the
Court held that failure to give such warnings does not require suppression of physical evidence gained from unwarned voluntary statements.3
The dissenting justices were concerned about the negative effects this
ruling would have on police procedures, judicial inquiries, and suspect's
rights.4 This decision creates another exception to the Miranda rule
and could have the effect of weakening the rule in its entirety.

1. 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004) (plurality opinion).
2. Id. at 2624 (plurality opinion).
3. Id. at 2630 (plurality opinion).
4. Id. at 2631-32 (plurality opinion).
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2001 Samuel Francis Patane violated a restraining order by
attempting to telephone his ex-girlfriend, Linda O'Donnell. In June of
that year, Colorado Springs Police Officer Tracy Fox began to investigate
the matter. Around the same time, another detective, Josh Benner,
received information that Patane, a convicted felon, illegally possessed
a .40 caliber Glock pistol. Fox and Benner proceeded to Patane's
residence together.5
After reaching the residence, Officer Fox inquired into Patane's
attempts to contact O'Donnell and found sufficient cause to make an
arrest for violation of a restraining order. After the arrest, Detective
Benner attempted to advise Patane of his rights under Miranda v.
Arizona,6 but Patane interrupted, asserting that he knew his rights.
Neither officer attempted to complete the Miranda warnings. Benner
then proceeded to ask Patane about the Glock. Patane was initially
hesitant to discuss the matter, saying that he was not sure he should tell
Benner anything because he did not want Benner to take the gun away.
After Benner persisted, Patane told him that the pistol was in his
bedroom and gave the detective permission to retrieve the gun.7
Patane was charged with, and later indicted by a grand jury for,
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The United States District
Court for the District of Colorado granted Patane's motion to suppress
the pistol on the grounds that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest
him. Although the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the probable
cause ruling, the Court affirmed the suppression order on an alternate
theory that the gun was the fruit of an unwarned statement. 8 On a
grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case
in a 5-4 decision. 9
III.

A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Miranda: A Solution to Coercive Police Tactics
The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment states: "No

person ...

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

Id. at 2624-25 (plurality opinion).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2625 (plurality opinion).
Id. (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2630 (plurality opinion).
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against himself."1" The Supreme Court has long recognized that the
Fifth Amendment, in concert with the Fourteenth Amendment's due

process clause, prohibits the use of coerced confessions in both state and

federal courts. 1 In the early twentieth century, the Court based its
determination of whether a confession was coerced or voluntary on the
evaluation of the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the
interrogation." A confession was deemed voluntary, and therefore
admissible, if it was not "'extracted by any sort of threats or violence,
nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by
the exertion of any improper influence.'" 13 While the "totality of the
circumstances" test proved to be effective at deterring physical coercion
by police during custodial interrogations, the test had less of an effect on
deterring the increasingly psychological tactics used by police towards
the middle of the twentieth century. 4 These psychological tactics made
the voluntariness of a statement harder to determine and the "totality
of the circumstances" test more difficult to apply.'5
Recognizing that the modern practice of custodial interrogation was
becoming more psychological in nature, the Warren Court attempted to
set concrete guidelines for law enforcement agencies to follow.'6 In
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 n.9 (1944) (overturning the
conviction of a man who confessed after 36 straight hours of police interrogation without
sleep or rest by experienced investigators and highly trained lawyers).
12. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957) (holding that the admission into
evidence of the confession of an uneducated African-American, who was taken to the state
prison far from his home, repeatedly questioned in isolation, and denied the presence of his
father and lawyer, was a violation of his due process rights).
13. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897) (quoting 3 RUSSELL ON CRIMES
478 (6th ed. 1896)) (finding a detective's testimony regarding confessionary statements
made by the accused to him in a previous interview to be inadmissible due to the fact that
they were not given voluntarily by the accused).
14. Police began developing psychological interrogation tactics such as good cop/bad cop
(one police officer being extremely friendly and understanding while the other acted in an
overly harsh and antagonizing manner), false line-ups (in which the suspect was put in a
line-up and identified by a coached witness before interrogation), blame shifting (where the
interrogating officer would downplay the seriousness of the crime and blame the victim or
society), and false legal advice (for example, officers telling suspects that their crimes only
constituted self-defense in order to gain confessions). Interrogators also developed canned
responses to discourage witnesses from following through on requests to consult an
attorney. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966) (citing FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E.
REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1962)).
15. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321 (1959) (holding a conviction based on the
confession of a suspect invalid when police officers denied a suspect that turned himself in
the right to see his previously retained attorney and continued to question him for eight
more hours).
16. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42.
10.
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Miranda v. Arizona, the Court first developed a specific set of preinterrogation warnings that must be given to suspects under custodial
interrogations. 7 According to the Court, custodial interrogation is
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
Before police interrogate a suspect in
in any significant way."' 8
custody, the suspect must be informed that (1) they have the right to
remain silent, (2) that any statement they do make may be used against
them, and (3) that they have a right to an attorney, either retained or
appointed.' 9 Waiver of these rights is only effective if made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently after the warnings have been given.20
In addition to the warning, the Court also established procedural safeguards to protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. Once a suspect has invoked their Fifth Amendment right
to remain silent, the police must stop the interrogation, and the
prosecution may not use the suspect's refusal to cooperate against the
suspect at tial.
The Court implemented the Miranda warnings and their procedural
safeguards based on the reasoning that confessions gained in a coercive
atmosphere could never truly be the product of free choice.22 The Court
based this conclusion on cases in which the defendants' statements may
have been voluntary in the traditional sense, but their admissions were
nonetheless violations of the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. 23 The Court made it clear that a statement would not be
admissible without both the proper warnings and adequate waiver.24

17.
18.

Id. at 444.
Id.

19.

Id.

20. Id. at 444, 470.
21. Id. at 468, 473-74.
22. Id. at 458.
23. Id. at 456. The Court was referring to Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 303 (1963)
(holding inadmissible the confession of a 19-year-old heroine addict who was described as
a "near mental defective"); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 578 (1963) (reversing the conviction
of a woman who confessed after being told that her children would be removed by the
authorities if she did not cooperate); and Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963)
(reversing the conviction of a man who repeatedly asked to speak with either his wife or
attorney during police interrogation and was refused until he gave a written confession).
24. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.
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B. A Changing Court's Distaste for Miranda as Evidenced by a
Systematic Erosion of the Ruling
The Warren Court decided Miranda in 1966, but soon after, beginning
in 1970, the Burger Court started to weaken the precedent Miranda set
forth. With the addition of Chief Justice Burger in 1969, followed by
Blackmun in 1970, and later Powell and Rehnquist in 1972, the Court
began to back away from the rationale adopted in Miranda. Instead of
classifying Miranda warnings as a constitutional right in and of
themselves, the newly structured Court chose to view the warnings
prescribed by Miranda as prophylactic in nature. Characterizing the
Miranda decision as prophylactic instead of constitutional allowed the
Court much more discretion in determining how Miranda should be
applied. The newly aligned Court used this distinction to systematically
weaken the rule instead of overruling their brethren on a decision with
which they did not agree.
Evidence of this strategy can first be seen in Harris v. New York. 23
A mere five years after the Miranda decision, the Court held that while
statements gained from a suspect in violation of Miranda could not be
used in the prosecution's case-in-chief, they were admissible for
impeaching a witness's testimony at trial.26 In Harrisa suspected drug
dealer was arrested and then questioned without being advised of his
right to counsel.2 ' At trial, the prosecution used the transcript of this
Chief Justice Burger
questioning to impeach Harris's testimony."
stated that "the shield of Miranda" could not be used to prevent the
prosecution from admitting into evidence prior inconsistent utterances
the defendant made voluntarily.29 The Court was not concerned about
weakening the deterrence effects of Miranda,reasoning that inappropriate police conduct was sufficiently discouraged by the exclusion of
evidence from the prosecutions case-in-chief.3 °
Using similar reasoning, the Court in Michigan v. Tucker 3 ' approved
the use of testimony from a man that police located only as a result of
the suspect's comments during unwarned questioning.32 In Thcker the
Court reiterated the proposition that statements taken in violation of

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

401 U.s. 222 (1971).
Id. at 226.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 226.
Id.
417 U.S. 433 (1974).
Id. at 452.

1504

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

Miranda principles cannot be used by the prosecution to prove its case
at trial.3 However, the court reasoned that because Tucker's statements were only used to locate a witness and were not used by the
prosecution in its case-in-chief, there was no violation of Tucker's
constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment. 4
The Court
concluded that the police did not violate the suspect's right against selfincrimination, but only infringed upon the prophylactic rules put in
place by Miranda to protect that right.33 Again, the Court was not
swayed by the need to deter inappropriate police conduct, stating that
this rationale loses much of its force when the police acted in good
faith.36
The Supreme Court developed another exception to the Miranda rule
in New York v. Quarles.37 In Quarles a police officer pursued Benjamin
Quarles, an armed rape suspect, into a grocery store. After apprehending Quarles, the officer noticed that Quarles was wearing an empty
shoulder holster and asked him where he hid the gun. Quarles indicated
that the gun was hidden in some empty cartons, and the officer retrieved
the weapon. 8 The Supreme Court of Queens County, New York held
that the gun was inadmissible because the suspect was not given
Miranda warnings before his confession about the whereabouts of the
weapon. 9 This decision was affirmed on appeal through the New York
Court of Appeals.4 ° On a grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court
reversed. 41 In an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, the Court
introduced a "public safety" exception to the Miranda rule.42 Once
again, the Court viewed Miranda warnings as prophylactic, saying that
the warnings themselves are not rights, but simply a means to protect
the actual right against self-incrimination. 4 The Court reasoned that
the need for answers from a suspect when public safety is concerned
outweighed the need for a prophylactic rule protecting the constitutional
right against self-incrimination."

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 445.
Id.
Id. at 445-46.
Id. at 447.
467 U.S. 649 (1984).
Id. at 652.
Id. at 652-53.
Id. at 653.
Id. at 660.
Id. at 655-56.
Id. at 654.
Id. at 657.

2005]

UNITED STATES V. PATANE

1505

The Court's characterization of Miranda as a prophylactic rule
In Elstad, Michael Elstad was
continued in Oregon v. Elstad.45
suspected of burglarizing his neighbor's home. Two police officers went
to his home with a warrant for his arrest. During an interrogation in
his living room, Elstad admitted that he had participated in the
burglary, and the officers transported him to the sheriff's headquarters.
Approximately one hour later, Elstad was advised of his Miranda rights
and proceeded to give a full confession.4" The Oregon Court of Appeals
reversed Elstad's conviction, reasoning that after the earlier confession
in the living room the "'cat was sufficiently out of the bag to exert a
coercive impact on [Elstad's] later admissions.'"4 7 On a grant of
certiorari, the Supreme Court suppressed Elstad's first unwarned
confession but allowed his later confession to be admitted at trial.4"
The Court reasoned that a subsequent administration of Miranda
warnings would cure the condition that made the previous statement
inadmissible.4 9 If the first statement was voluntary, then the only
relevant inquiry is whether the second statement was also voluntary.5 °
Thus, the Court held that a suspect can waive their rights and confess
despite previously responding to unwarned questioning.51
C. Dickerson Demands a Commitment: Miranda as a Prophylactic
Rule or a ConstitutionalRule?
After three decades and numerous decisions characterizing Miranda
as a prophylactic rule, the Supreme Court complicated the issue when
it held that Miranda was a constitutional rule in Dickerson v. United
States.52 In Dickerson the Court held that because Miranda announced
53
a constitutional rule, Congress could not supercede it legislatively.
Miranda's application to state court proceedings was one factor the
54
Court relied upon in its characterization of Miranda as constitutional.

45. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
46. Id. at 300-01.
47. Id. at 303.
48. Id. at 318.
49. Id. at 310-11.
50. Id. at 318.
51. Id.
52. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
53. Id. at 444. At issue in Dickerson was 18 U.S.C. § 3501, a federal evidentiary
statute, which created the rule that the admissibility of a statement made during a
custodial interrogation would turn on whether it was voluntarily made. According to the
statute, the issue of whether Miranda warnings were given or not would simply be one
factor for ascertaining the voluntariness of the statement.
54. Id. at 438.
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The Court reasoned that Miranda must be a constitutional decision
because the Supreme Court has no supervisory authority over state
judicial proceedings unless enforcement of the Constitution is involved.5 5 The Court also noted that this conclusion was buttressed by
the fact that prisoners were allowed to bring Miranda violations before
the federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings.5" For a habeas corpus
proceeding to be available, the prisoner must allege that they were in
custody in violation of either the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.5" The Court stated that "[slince the Miranda rule is
clearly not based on federal laws or treaties.. ." allowing for review of
Miranda claims in habeas corpus proceedings assumes that Miranda's
origin is constitutional.5 8
The Court addressed some of the exceptions previously made to the
Mirandarule in cases such as Quarles and Harrisby explaining that the
earlier decisions illustrated that "no constitutional rule is immutable."5 9
The Court stated that it would be impossible for courts to foresee all the
circumstances in which counsel could attempt to apply a general rule
that had been laid down, and the modifications represented by the
earlier cases "are as much a normal part of constitutional law as the
original decision."' ° The Court also stated that Elstad simply stood for
the proposition that "unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth
Amendment."6 1
In holding that Miranda announced a constitutional rule, the Court
in Dickerson moved away from its former view of Miranda as a
prophylaxis protecting the right against self-incrimination. Although the
Court reasoned that the holding in Dickerson was reconcilable with its
earlier decisions in Harris, Tucker, Quarles, and Elstad because "no
constitutional rule is immutable," 2 the decision created splits in the
courts of appeals on the issue. 5 Four years after Dickerson, the Court
attempted to clarify its position in Patane.6

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id. at 438 n.3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 441.
Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2624 (2004) (plurality opinion).
124 S. Ct. 2620 (plurality opinion).
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COURT'S RATIONALE

The Plurality Opinion (Thomas, Rehnquist, and Scalia)
65
In the plurality opinion of United States v. Patane, the Court
concluded that failure to give a suspect the warnings proscribed by
6
" did not require the suppression of physical fruits obtained
Miranda
67
The
through a suspect's unwarned but voluntary statements.
plurality based this conclusion on the fact that the Miranda rule is a
prophylaxis used to protect against violations of the Self-Incrimination
6
Clause ("Clause") of the Fifth Amendment. " Because the admission
into evidence of the physical fruit of a voluntary statement does not
implicate the Clause, the Court refused to extend the Miranda rule to
the context of the Patane case. 9 The Court stated that Miranda
primarily focuses on the criminal trial and is not a code of police
conduct; therefore, police do not violate the Constitution by failing to
give suspects Miranda warnings.7 v
The Court stated that the core protection provided by the Clause is
against compelling a criminal defendant to testify against themselves at
trial.7v In essence, the Clause "'was directed at the employment of the
legal process to extract from the person's own lips an admission of guilt,
which would thus take the place of other evidence[.]'" 72 The Court
admitted that it had applied several prophylactic rules, including
Miranda, in an effort to protect the privilege against self-incrimination. 7' The Court reasoned that these rules were necessary to address
the concern that "'an inability to protect the right [against self-incrimination] at one stage of a proceeding may make its invocation useless at
a later stage.'"7 4 The Court, however, also realized that these prophylactic rules were necessarily broader than the actual protections of the
Clause and that "any further extension of these rules must be justified
by its necessity for the protection of the actual right against compelled
A.

65. 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004) (plurality opinion).
66. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
67. Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2624.
68. Id. at 2626 (plurality opinion); U.S. CONST. amend. V.
69. Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2626 (plurality opinion).
70. Id. (plurality opinion).
71. Id. (plurality opinion).
72. Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 2263, at 378 (J. McNaughton, rev. ed. 1961)).
73. Id. at 2627 (plurality opinion).
74. Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1974)).
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self-incrimination."7 5 For this reason, the Court concluded that the
Miranda rule does not require that the fruits of unwarned statements
be discarded as inherently tainted.7 6
The Court also found a reason not to expand Miranda to Patane's
situation in the actual text of the Clause.77 The Court pointed out that
the language in the Fifth Amendment stating that "no person ... shall
7
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself'
contains its own exclusionary rule. 79 Due to this rule, confessions or
evidence derived from coercive police tactics are automatically prevented
from being used at trial.80 The Court reasoned that a strong presumption against expanding the Miranda rule exists because of this explicit
textual protection. 81
Addressing the characterization of Miranda in Dickerson v. United
States 2 as one laying down a constitutional rule, the Court denied that
its ruling in Dickerson changed any of its observations in the present
case." The Court based this conclusion on the fact that "nothing in
Dickerson call[ed] into question [its] continued insistence that the closest
possible fit be maintained between the Self-Incrimination Clause and
Although the Court in Dickerson
any rule designed to protect it."
noted that cases since Miranda have reduced its impact on legitimate
law enforcement, Miranda's core ruling that unwarned statements
cannot be used in the prosecution's case-in-chief was intact.8 5 The
Court stated that its continued reliance on previous cases involving
8
'
Miranda, including both Michigan v. Tucker88 and Oregon v. Elstad,
in Dickerson demonstrated the continued validity of these decisions.88
The Court reasoned that "Dickerson'scharacterization of Miranda as a
constitutional rule [did] not lessen the need to maintain the closest
possible fit between the Self-Incrimination Clause and any judge-made
rule to protect it." 9 The Court then concluded that there was no such

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2628 (plurality opinion).
Id. (plurality opinion).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2628 (plurality opinion).
Id. (plurality opinion).
Id. (plurality opinion).
530 U.S. 428 (2000).
Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2628 (plurality opinion).
Id. (plurality opinion).
Id. (plurality opinion).
417 U.S. 433 (1974).
470 U.S. 298 (1985).
Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2628 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2629-30 (plurality opinion).
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fit in the present case because the admission of nontestimonial fruit of
a voluntary statement presented no risk that the suspect's coerced
statements would be used against him at trial. 90
The plurality conceded that if Dickerson stood for the proposition that
the taking of unwarned statements by police in itself violates a suspect's
constitutional rights, as the court of appeals held, then a strong
deterrence rationale would exist for suppression of the fruits.9 ' The
Court, however, reasoned that because potential Miranda violations do
not occur until the admission of unwarned statements at trial, there was
nothing to deter.92 The Court further stated that it was not its place
to impose preferred police practices on law enforcement officials.93
Therefore, because police cannot violate the Self-Incrimination Clause by
taking voluntary statements from suspects that have not been warned
according to Miranda, extending the rule in the present case could not
be justified under a deterrence effect on law enforcement. 94
B.

The Kennedy and O'Connor Concurrence

Justices Kennedy and O'Connor concurred only in judgment with the
plurality opinion. 95 They stated that the concerns underlying the
Miranda rule must be viewed in light of other objectives of the criminal
justice system.96 They agreed that Dickerson did not undermine earlier
Supreme Court precedents regarding Miranda, and noted that the case
against Patane presented an even stronger case for admitting the
evidence derived from his unwarned statements into evidence because
the gun in this case was physical in nature, as opposed to testimonial
like the earlier cases of Elstad and Thcker.9' Accordingly, permitting
the gun into evidence "does not run the risk of admitting into trial an
accused's coerced incriminating statements against himself."9 8 The
concurrence also noted that due to the important probative value of
reliable physical evidence, a deterrence rationale could not justify
exclusion of the evidence.99 The concurring justices differed in opinion
from the plurality because they determined that it was unnecessary to
decide whether the failure to give Patane full Mirandawarnings should

90.

Id. at 2630 (plurality opinion).

91. Id. at 2629 (plurality opinion).
92. Id. (plurality opinion).
93.

Id. (plurality opinion).

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 2630 (plurality opinion).
Id. (Kennedy & O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
Id. at 2631 (Kennedy & O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
Id. (Kennedy & O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
Id. (Kennedy & O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
Id. (Kennedy & O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
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be deemed a violation of the Miranda rule itself.'" The concurrence
also argued that it was unnecessary to determine whether there was
anything to deter as long as the unwarned statements were not later
used at trial.'
C. The Souter, Stevens, and GinsburgDissent
The dissent focused on the deterrence effect of Miranda."2 Its
concern was whether the majority's refusal to suppress physical evidence
obtained through unwarned but voluntary statements would create an
incentive for police to omit Miranda warnings."°3 According to the
dissent, a Miranda violation during a custodial interrogation raises a
presumption of coercion. °4 If the police do not give the warning meant
to counter that coercive environment, then the confession is inadmissible. 0 5 To turn around and allow tangible evidence to be admitted as
evidence would only increase the difficulty of assessing the voluntariness
of any information given under custodial interrogation. 0 6 The dissent
recognized the price involved in some cases when the evidence would be
excluded, but determined that protecting the Fifth Amendment was
worth the price.'0 7
The dissent did not agree with the rest of the Court that this case fell
in line with the other exceptions previously on the books.'0 8 They
distinguished Harris, arguing that allowing the use of unwarned
statements for impeachment purposes was necessary to protect the
integrity of the judicial process, a concern not at issue in the present
case.'0 9 The dissent also noted that the police's failure to warn Patane
could not be justified by any public safety concerns as was the case in
Quarles."' They also reasoned that Elstad was not on point because
the issue in Elstad involved a second set of statements after the
Miranda warning was given."' The dissent reasoned that the Elstad
rule did not apply to a gun that was seized "once and for all."" 2 Thus,

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

(Kennedy & O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
(Kennedy & O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
(Souter, Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
(Souter, Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
at 2632 (Souter, Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
at 2631 (Souter, Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
(Souter, Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).

Id. at 2631-32 (Souter, Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 2632 (Souter, Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Souter, Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Souter, Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Souter, Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Souter, Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
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the dissent feared that the case at hand was an invitation to police to
ignore Miranda when there was incriminating physical evidence to be
gained as a result. 113
D.

The Breyer Dissent

Justice Breyer wrote a short dissent in which he agreed with Justice
Souter's dissent and stated that he would apply the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine to the context of the present case." 4 Breyer
advocated an approach that would exclude physical evidence derived
from unwarned statements unless the failure to provide the Miranda
warnings was made in good faith." 5
V.

IMPLICATIONS

In United States v. Patane,"6 the Supreme Court faced the difficult
task of attempting to interpret the precedent set forth in Miranda v.
Arizona 117 in a way that did not infringe upon an individual's Fifth
Amendment right against self incrimination, but still allowed the
interest of justice to be served when police, acting in good faith,
negligently omit Miranda warnings. The Court's ruling that physical
evidence obtained from unwarned statements can be admitted at trial if
it was gained from voluntary statements will have wide ranging effects
on police procedures, judicial inquiries, and suspect's rights.
One important consequence of this decision is that allowing the
admission of physical evidence from unwarned, but voluntary, statements, while disallowing the same evidence if gained from coercion,
forces judges to decide whether unwarned statements that lead to
physical evidence were given voluntarily. This task is inherently
difficult. In essence, the majority is revitalizing the old "totality of the
circumstances" test with regard to physical evidence. It should not be
overlooked that this is the test the Court in Miranda sought to clarify.
The Court in Miranda attempted to do away with the difficult inquiry
into voluntariness by assuming a coercive atmosphere unless certain
warnings are given to, and effectively waived by, the suspect. The
Court's willingness to ignore this assumption and look solely at the

113. Id. (Souter, Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
114. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
115. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer expressed the same view in his
concurring opinion in Missouri v. Siebert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2613 (2004) (noting that
Miranda warnings given to suspect mid-interrogation after confession were insufficient to
make another confession post-warning admissible at trial).
116. 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004) (plurality opinion).
117. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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voluntariness of the statements as the determining factor of admissibility of physical evidence effectively weakened the entire Miranda rule
because physical evidence can be as persuasive as testimonial evidence.
Also, as the dissent noted, this decision will give evidentiary advantages to police that ignore Miranda. ' Under the Court's judgment,
police could decline to give a suspect Mirandawarnings before interrogation, and the suspect, not knowing of their right to remain silent, may
volunteer incriminating statements that lead to the discovery of equally
incriminating physical evidence. While the statements themselves would
not be admissible, the evidence would be, so long as the statements were
deemed to be voluntary. This result ignores the fact that physical
evidence may be equally as damning as testimonial evidence. As in the
case at hand, a gun found as the result of such an interrogation may be
sufficient alone to convict a defendant at trial. This result has the
possibility of undermining the protection against self-incrimination that
Miranda was supposed to ensure. The plurality's conclusion that
physical evidence is not protected under Miranda ignores the possible
testimonial nature of physical evidence. Why should a defendant's
unwarned statement that he has a gun be suppressed while the gun
itself should not? The incentive that the Court has created for police to
build cases in this manner could be a serious consequence overlooked by
the plurality.
Taken as a whole, Patane is simply an addition to a long line of
exceptions to the Mirandarule implemented by the Supreme Court since
the early 1970s. The Court should exercise caution when creating
exceptions to Miranda in order to preserve the valuable protection that
the Fifth Amendment gives to individuals in harsh custodial atmospheres. At the same time, the Court must not interpret Miranda so
strictly that serious injustices result from mistakes made by police
acting in good faith. In doing so, the Court seems to be content with a
case-by-case approach to Miranda issues for fear that any bright line
test offered would simply be perverted to distort the spirit of Miranda.
However, with the addition of each new exception, Mirandais weakened
a little more. Each exception is one more step down a slippery slope
that may eventually lead to the extinction of the protections the Court
in Miranda sought to institute.
DAVID BOSWORTH

118. United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2631 (2004) (Souter, Stevens &
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).

